William Hoffman Pincus, _The Problem of Gaugin's Therapist_, Avebury, 1994. In this book, I hope to demonstrate that formulations of madness and therapy are language- bound; that all human phenomena are open to competing and, often, mutually-exclusive interpretations. Therefore, psychotherapy is as likely to serve as an oppressive force stifling freedom and cultural advancement as it is to be a liberating agent of the individual; and, most significantly, that no criteria can distinguish whether it serves as the former or the latter. All of these claims follow naturally from a proper understanding of the structure of language and its role in the construction of social reality. p 5 (U)nconscious and conscious political choices merge in the declaration that a particular individual, in conflict with his community, requires psychological counseling. Increasingly, conflicts between an individual and the wider society are being defined as psychological in nature and dealt with therapeutically. Far from questioning the political assumptions underlying this approach, society see this as progressive and humane. p 4 Most of the "care" with which we treat those who fail to conform to our social norms, or who hold beliefs outside the broad middle band of accepted differences, effectively operates to systematically beat down their uniqueness. This results in the *norm*alization of society, in the most ominous sense of term. p 5 (A) question not asked, a word or phrase repeated or withheld, the language of debate shapes public perception and opinion. The manner in which ... controversies are presented to the public are political choices, political events. ... (n)o mater which interpretative framework we use, we are always making political choices. p 33 (E)very society designates some class of people ... to decide which manifestations of the core alienation endemic to the human condition will be classified as "normal" and which abnormal." ... (What are) the costs to society of maintaining the status quo ... (and is there) a more tolerant alternative to the objectification through classification of other human beings. p 34 (L)anguage structures our experience of the world, particularly our experience of social reality. ... (W)e learn to perceive madness in exactly the way that the experts in our culture language madness. Rural Haitians *are* possessed and New York intellectuals *are* neurotic. ... (Categories of presumed psychopathology are primarily used to serve the social order rather than to ameliorate individual suffering. p 40 (T)he concept of madness has value only in relation to established norms of behavior. There is no other external standard in respect to which we can measure whether any particular behavior should fall on one side or the other of the sanity/insanity dichotomy. That is, there is no absolute sanity or insanity. ... Madness is revealed to be a linguistic construct dependent upon cultural formulations for its supposititious "essence." p 43 The mental health establishment is a socializing agent of the dominant culture and labels as mad the range of behaviors the culture won't tolerate. p 47 The Mental Health Establishment acts under the unexamined delusion that it works as a beneficent force for change when it in fact serves as an agent for social conformity or for its won economic gain. p 55 The Mental Health Establishment protects existing power relations in society by bestowing a negative status upon a class of troubling citizens and resocializing them to better fir the society's needs or, at least, occupying them so that they do not hinder the achievement of other social aims. p 61 Horacio Fabrega, Jr, ... discovers that some cultures, tern societies in particular, produce far greater incidence of schizophrenia than others. ... (H) concludes that the decisive factor is the manner in which the culture tolerates the outward manifestation of disturbance. "A schizophrenic illness will evolve differently in a milieu where its properties are not disvalued and the self that reveals it is not likely to be discredited.' p 64 Changes in the political and social structure invariably result in corresponding changes in psychological notions of health and sickness. p 77 Madness ia an ambiguous concept wholly dependent upon the language used to articulate it and the culture which gives it expression. 79 The patient suffers the ultimate alienation from his won language; his words no longer mean what he the patient, intends them to mean -- they now mean what the analyst, as "expert", declares that they mean. p 94 So long as we listen with the ear of a Mental Health Professional, ready to interpret the "underlying meaning" of their speech ... (w)e never hear them speak their own meanings in their own voices. p 192 There is nothing irrational, I maintain, in objecting to being indefinitely confined, having one's entire life history reinterpreted by a stranger, being subjected to a schedule of mind- altering drugging, and living under the threat of having one's brain shocked or even dissected, all on the as-yet-unproven theory that this is good for you. Why is it so hard of the Mental Health Establishment to hear these voices? p 103 (Judi's book is cited on this subject on the preceding page.) When we call a thing "mad", we fail to see its truth or beauty. When we a thing "art", we overlook its narcissistic, delusional and/or hallucinatory qualities. p 109 (C)ontemporary mental health practices would have denied Gauguin his destiny, denied the world a great artist and almost certainly have done nothing to benefit Gaugin or his family. ... (I)t is not Gauguin who should be judged by contemporary mental health practices, rather it is the contemporary practice of mental health which must be weighed against the works of Gaugin. p 113 This study of language, madness and therapy leads to four devastating conclusions which, in combination, destroy the therapeutic enterprise: 1) Inasmuch as language is prior to and independent of the communicating subject, language must displace the 'sovereignty of consciousness' as the customary starting point of the therapeutic project. 2) The demonstration that language creates social truth robs madness -- the subject of therapy -- of essence and reduces it to a mutable cultural and moral valuation. 3) As cultural articulations of madness imply their "cure," therapy's masquerade as a benevolent activity is exposed and its true object is revealed: the oppressive normalization of deviance. 4) Finally, as madness and creativity comprise a unitary phenomenon such that every appearance of one contains the other, the true end of all psychotherapeutic effort is the reduction of the extraordinary to the ordinary. Our deconstruction of therapy is complete. p 114 People who are confused, scared or angry don't have to be conceptualized as "sick." They might just be confused, scared, or angry. Behavior which is unconventional, unorthodox or just plain strange does not have to be "treated" by society. It could just be tolerated. p 115 There remain people who are criminals, people who are disturbing, and people who are disturbed. p 115 (T)he therapeutic solution has not been demonstrably successful, yet more and more legal but atypical behavior is classified as sick. ... By eliminating the third-party complaint (usually police or family) as a means of entry into the mental health system we could prevent the worst of the present abuses. p 116 (For the disturbed individual), the aim of ... treatment should be to convey to the patient that they must seek their own partial and unsatisfactory answers in life. No therapist can cure the alienation at the core of the human condition. p 117 (It) is possible for society to abolish or severely limit the application of concepts of psychopathology. In so doing, the society would necessarily become more inclusive of its members, more respectful of those who accentuate their differences from social norms and more directly and successfully helpful towards those who most need that help. p 118