My reading notes from: Robert Axelrod, _The Evolution of 
Cooperation_, Basic Books, 1984.  I found the lessons here,
which evolved from exercises in game theory, 
large, simple, and wise.
 
"When should a person cooperate, and when should a  person
be selfish ... ?" p vii
 
"(C)ooperation based solely on reciprocity seemed possible. 
...  First, how can a potentially cooperative strategy get
an initial foothold in an environment which is predominantly
noncooperative?  Second, what type of strategy can thrive in
a variegated environment composed of other individuals use a
wide diversity of more or less sophisticated strategies? 
Third, under what conditions can such a strategy, once fully
established among a group of people, resist invasion by a
less cooperative strategy?" pp viii, ix
 
"Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of
egoists without central authority?" p 3
 
     1.  The beginning of the story is that cooperation can
     get started even in a world of unconditional defection.
 
     The development _cannot_ take place if it is tried only
     be scattered individuals who have virtually no chance
     to interact with each other.  However, cooperation can
     evolve from small clusters of individuals who base
     their cooperation on reciprocity and have even a small
     proportion of their interactions with each other.
 
     2.  The middle of the story is that a strategy based on
     reciprocity can thrive in a world where many different
     kinds of strategies are being tried.
 
     3.  The end of the story is that cooperation, once
     established on the basis of reciprocity, can protect
     itself from invasion by less cooperative strategies. 
     Thus, the gear wheels of social evolution have a
     ratchet.  pp 20, 21
 
Advice on how to do well ( p 110):
 
     1. Don't be envious.
     2. Don't be the first to defect.
     3. Reciprocate both cooperation and defection.
     4. Don't be too clever.
 
"The moral of the story is that the precise level of
forgiveness that is optimal depends upon  the environment. 
In particular, if the main danger is unending mutual
recriminations, then a generous level of forgiveness is
appropriate.  But, if the main danger is from strategies
that are good at exploiting easygoing rules, than an excess
of forgiveness is costly." p 120
 
"(T)he scope of sustainable cooperation can be expanded by
any improvement in the players' ability to recognize each
other from the past, and to be confident about the prior
actions that have actually been taken." p 140
 
     (W)ithout the shadow of the future, cooperation becomes
     impossible to sustain.  Thus, the role of time
     perspectives is critical in the maintenance of
     cooperation.  When the interaction is likely to
     continue for a long time, and the players care enough
     about their future together, the conditions are ripe
     for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.
         The foundation of cooperation is not really trust,
     but the durability of the relationship.  When the
     conditions are right, the players can come to cooperate
     with each other through trial-and-error learning about
     the possibilities for mutual rewards, through imitation
     of other successful players, or even through a blind
     process of selection of the more successful strategies
     with a weeding out of the less successful ones. 
     Whether the players trust each other or not is less
     important in the long run than whether the conditions
     are ripe for them to build a stable pattern of
     cooperation with each other. p 182
 
"(O)nce cooperation based upon reciprocity gets established
in a population, it cannot be overcome even by a cluster of
individuals who try to exploit the others." p 189
 
"In a vast range of situations mutual cooperation can be
better for _both_ sides than mutual defection.  The key to
doing well lies not in overcoming others, but in eliciting
their cooperation." p 190